A HISTORY OF VOCATION: TRACING A KEYWORD OF WORK, MEANING, AND MORAL PURPOSE

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This article traces the historical shifts in usage of the term vocation as a significant keyword wherein a range of different connotations and assumptions about the nature of work and the relationship between the domain of work and the practice of adult education are negotiated and contested. The aim of this article is to establish a wider backdrop against which contemporary understandings of vocation and work as they related to the field of adult education can be considered. By charting the major historical shifts in the usage of this term, this article explores some of the contrasting narratives of work as a source of meaning still carried by the term in contemporary usage.

Keywords: vocation; nature of work; keywords; historical analysis; ideology

The term vocation occurs frequently in the adult education literature, reflecting a range of diverse views about the nature of the field, the nature of work, and the rightful relationship between the two. Collins (1991), for instance, proposes the idea of adult education as a vocation to distinguish it from a view of the field framed by a narrow preoccupation with efficiency, measurable outcomes, and careerist thinking. Martin (2001) similarly poses the question, “What can we do to rescue adult education as a vocation, i.e., as the work we choose to do as distinct from the job we have to do?” (p. 257). This stands in some contrast with the meaning of

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vocation intended by Lindeman (1926/1961), when he describes adult education as resolutely nonvocational in character, as the kind of education that begins “where vocational education leaves off” (p. 3). On one hand, the word vocation challenges the idea of work defined as a job; on the other hand, it refers precisely to the idea of work-as-job that the first meaning sets itself so squarely apart from. Between these extremes are a number of further usages in which the locus of vocation shifts from the field of practice broadly defined (Selman, Dampier, Cooke, & Selman, 1998) to the practice of the educator (Hansen, 1994; hooks, 2003) to the life aspirations of the learner (Dewey, 1959; Freire, 1968/1970) to a host of other contexts and practices, including religious life, where it first originated and still retains a primary affiliation (Elias, 2003; Gumport, 1997; Haynes, 1997; Kovan & Dirkx, 2003; Palmer, 2000; White, 2002).

This array and bifurcation of meanings lends credence to Doyle’s (1999) assertion that vocation (and its cognate calling) are terms often cited but seldom developed in the field of adult education and professional studies more broadly. Frequently, she states, “these words are bandied about by professionals, politicians and practitioners—each with their own understanding, but not necessarily related” (p. 29). “If we are going to start using these terms,” she goes on to say, “we need a firm basis of understanding on which to ground our explorations” (p. 2). Beyond simply definitional ambiguity, however, what is reflected in these various usages is a family of diverse conceptions and assumptions regarding the purpose of adult education and other social practices, the question of what constitutes a meaningful life, and the significance of work as a source of personal and social meaning. Building on Doyle’s recommendation that a firmer basis of understanding of vocation is needed, the purpose of this article is to trace the history of its usage as presented in the literature of a number of different disciplines. My aim, in looking to the past, is to establish a wider backdrop against which contemporary understandings of vocation and work in the field of adult education can be considered. By charting the major historical shifts in the usage of this term, I will explore some of the tacit assumptions and connotations that it still carries today.

A NOTE ON IMPETUS AND APPROACH

This study of vocation is rooted in a long-standing interest I have had in interrogating the concept of “work” from historical, political, cultural, philosophical, and pedagogical perspectives. The domain of work has always been a focus of interest in adult education, although it has become a matter of increasing preoccupation for scholars and practitioners in recent decades. In Rubenson’s (2000) words, the “most profound change in the landscape of adult education over the last twenty years is the influence perhaps best characterized as the ‘long arm of the job’” (p. 398). However, as Butler (2001) notes, despite the many ways work is of significance, in the present economically driven agenda, “the contemporary framing of work in work-related education discourses and texts tends to both interpret and so
represent work in its capitalist garb: as paid work in the labor market/force, as the production or consumption of commodities” (pp. 64-65). With this in mind, what drew me to the word *vocation* was the ambiguous and varied connotations about work that it carries in different contexts, as well as its historical rootedness outside the contemporary labor market frame. For these reasons, it offers a useful vantage point for standing back and examining the field of meanings and mythic narratives about work and purposeful activity that are a part of common usage in adult education and other discourse communities.

My approach to this inquiry is influenced by the English cultural critic Raymond Williams's (1976) writing about vocabulary as a source of insight into the structures of meaning built into our sense of the everyday. For Williams and others (Bourdieu, 1991; Fraser & Gordon, 1994), particular words and expressions often become emblems of symbolic power where tacit assumptions about social experience are embedded and contested. By examining the trends associated with changing usage over time, it is possible to get a sense of changing worldview and the inevitable inconsistencies and ambiguities that go along with such changes. With the study of vocabulary, “We find a history and complexity of meanings ... [where] words which seem to have been there for centuries, with continuous general meanings, have come in fact to express radically different or radically variable, yet sometimes hardly noticed, meanings and implications” (Williams, 1976, p. 15). Following Williams, my analysis was carried out “in an area where several disciplines converge but in general do not meet” (p. 15). As an exercise in broad intellectual history, it deals with the ambiguous border region where religious, ethical, economic, and ideological concerns converge. I have drawn on a number of texts examining the history of work and historical roots of vocation, and other texts where the term is used with a particularly influential or striking resonance. I have been especially informed by Goldman’s (1988) analysis of the significance of vocation in the work of Thomas Mann and Max Weber, Mintz’s (1978) study of the theme of vocation in 19th-century English literature, Bernstein’s (1997) and Beder’s (2000) studies of the rise of contemporary work values, and Hardy’s (1990) exploration of the concept of vocation as it relates to contemporary notions of career development. There is a tendency, in approaching the history of ideas in this fashion, to attribute broad societal and attitudinal changes to the writings of particular individuals. The intention here is not to credit these individuals with the single-handed responsibility for wholesale shifts in prevailing zeitgeist but to refer to them as iconic figures whose works represent social changes that were naturally much messier and more hotly argued and nuanced than this portrayal suggests.

**HISTORICAL MEANINGS OF VOCATION**

Vocation is, in its origins, a term with deep religious roots and associations. One of the earliest usages of vocation is connected to the Christian monastic tradition established in the Middle Ages (Applebaum, 1992; Beder, 2000; Goldman, 1988;
Hardy, 1990; Haynes, 1997). Derived from the Latin term *vocatio*, it was a term used to describe a call away from the world of productive activity in order to dedicate one’s life to prayer and contemplation. “A ‘vocation’ or ‘calling’ originally referred to the work of monks, nuns and priests who served God by removing themselves from daily life and serving the church. In this way they could achieve salvation and attain God’s grace” (Beder, 2000, p. 14).

The medieval ideal of vocation involving a life dedicated to contemplative prayer was a reflection of the wider sensibility of the times, where contemplation was held in higher social regard than the world of productive work and manual labor (Applebaum, 1992; Arendt, 1958). As in earlier Greek and Roman times, work was typically viewed more as necessary toil than as a worthwhile activity holding intrinsic value in its own right. The ideal of freedom, for the Greeks, was situated in the public realm beyond the sphere of necessary toil, which was by and large the province of slaves and laborers (and, in the household, women). Although many Greek citizens did work, it had neither status nor positive morality attached. The Romans adopted a similar attitude, and this view persisted by and large into the medieval period (Applebaum, 1992; Hardy, 1990). Throughout, the primacy of contemplation over worldly activity rested on the conviction that no work of human hands could equal either the “ancient truth of Being or the Christian truth of the living God, which could only reveal itself in stillness” (Arendt, 1958, p. 15).

Despite the primacy of contemplative prayer in the monastic context, manual work was also an integral part of the daily routine, to be shared by all members of the community (Fry, 1980). However, the value of work, beyond its practical necessity, was as an ascetic discipline for furthering one’s contemplative capacity. The idea of work as a source of personal satisfaction or material gain in its own right was discounted. Personal pleasure in work, for example, was a symptom of sinful pride, with strongly negative moral overtones (Applebaum, 1992; Beder, 2000; Fry, 1980). Chapter 57 of the *Rule of St. Benedict*, one of the founding documents of Western monasticism, states that if a monk became “puffed up by his skillfulness in his craft” (Fry, 1980, p. 77), he was to be removed from practicing it. Profit from work was considered equally sinful. “The evil of avarice must have no part in establishing prices, which should, therefore, always be a little lower than people outside the monastery are able to set” (p. 78).

The monastic ideal of vocation as a call to religious life underwent a significant reversal during the Protestant Reformation of the late 15th and early 16th centuries (Applebaum, 1992; Beder, 2000; Goldman, 1988; Hardy, 1990; Mintz, 1978). The German theologian Martin Luther is often regarded as a pivotal figure in this shift, although his writings were inevitably influenced by the broader social context in which the agrarian feudal economies of late medieval Europe were beginning to be challenged by the growth of more entrepreneurial urban economies (Bernstein, 1997). Luther, originally an Augustinian monk, was highly critical of what he saw as the corruption of the formal hierarchy of the Catholic Church, including the monastic orders. Luther argued “that a divine calling could be followed no matter
what one’s occupation. Thus elevated, non-religious work was no longer a punish-
ment but was, in Luther’s thinking, a blessing, something sacred to be enjoyed” (Beder, 2000, p. 15). As Tilgher (1930, p. 50) puts it, Luther’s view of the sanctity of work regardless of status or station “placed a crown on the sweaty forehead of labor” as something that carried positive moral value in and of itself.

The idea of daily work as a divine vocation became a central tenet of the classic notion of the so-called Protestant work ethic, which found its fullest expression in the works of Protestant theologians such as John Calvin and other writers in the Puritan tradition. Social and intellectual changes during this period included the “influence of a rapidly expanding market economy, accelerated urbanization, technologival innovation, and vast political reorganization” (Hardy, 1990, p. 65). Work came to be invested with even greater moral virtue, not simply through accepting one’s unique place or station in the order of things, as with Luther, but through industrious diligence, hard work, and austere living (Bernstein, 1997). The purpose of work, for Calvin, was to actively reshape the world in the fashion of the divine kingdom and through one’s dedicated labors to prove oneself one of the Elect, “those persons chosen by God to inherit eternal life” (Hill, 1996, p. 4). Productivity and profit came to be seen as proof of spiritual accomplishment rather than impedi-
ments to it. Although for the Calvinists worldly success as a sign of Election was not initially intended as a warrant to gluttony and unbridled consumption, “in their zeal to define a new moral standard for man they unintentionally gave diligence in commerce an unprecedented moral sanction” (Bernstein, 1997, p. 23).

With the rapidly expanding entrepreneurial spirit of the 18th and 19th centuries, the idea of vocation took on an increasingly secular connotation, and occupational work concurrently became an increasingly central dimension of human worth and dignity. Work became necessary and desired, not for the glory of God but for the sake of personal fulfillment and dignity. The concept of vocation came to “rein-
force the idea that the human being is essentially and primarily a worker” (Meilaender, 2000, p. 13), and that work—especially paid work—was the primary sphere in which the ultimate in human expression and fulfillment could be achieved. In the words of the 19th-century German philosopher Arnold Ruge, for instance, work came to be seen (masculinist bias fully intended) as “the lib-
erating activity of thinking man [and] . . . the most important confirmation of man’s peculiar being” (as cited in Löwith, 1964, p. 273). As technical economics increasingly came to dominate and drive the social agenda, vocation came increas-
ingly to be equated with careers and occupations within the established sphere of paid employment.

There was a notable difference, of course, between the profit-making endeavors of the thriving bourgeoisie and the difficult, low-paying labor of manual workers. As some critics have claimed (Bauman, 1998; Tawney, 1964), the concept of voca-
tion as epitomized in the “work ethic” in and around the time of the industrial revo-
lution was, as much as anything, a battle for control and subordination. It was a “power struggle in everything but name, a battle to force the working people to
accept, in the name of the ethical nobility of working life, a life neither noble nor responding to their own standards of moral decency” (Bauman, 1998, p. 8). Chief among the critics was Karl Marx. Yet, despite being a vehement critic of the commodification, exploitation, and alienation of divided labor under capitalist production, about work itself—restored to unity and dignity—Marx was much more positive. Although Marx did not use the term vocation specifically, his view of work was imbued with a sense of vocational meaning, particularly evident in his idealization of nonalienated work as the central facet of what it means to be human (Arendt, 1958; Marx, 1989). Instead of contemplating God or Being, as with the ancients, according to Marx “we are to find our fulfillment in contemplating ourselves in the works of our own hands” (as cited in Hardy, 1990, p. 30).

Another pivotal figure in the literature about work and vocation is the German sociologist Max Weber. It is Weber who notoriously claimed that the Protestant ideal of vocation, especially in its most extreme Calvinist expression, was the underlying force and spiritual ally facilitating the rise and dominance of Western capitalism. For Weber (1930/1976), “the idea of duty in one’s calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs” (p. 124). To counter his critique of vocation as a malign force underlying the growing dominance of capitalist economic rationality, he called for the reconstitution of a (secularized) concept of vocation in noneconomic spheres of life (Weber, 1919/1958a, 1919/1958b). In particular, he argued for the restoration of vocation viewed as a form of “selfless service and submission or devotion to a higher ideal, goal, or object” (Goldman, 1988, p. 14). For Weber, as with Marx, although work needed to be salvaged from the degradations of capitalist production and acquisition, it was clearly work that needed to be salvaged rather than any other form of human activity (such as contemplation or leisure, as would have been the case in medieval and classical times).

Weber’s (1930/1976, p. 123) call for a renewed sense of vocation as a challenge to “the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order” was part of a growing expression of societal disillusionment of the day. Goldman (1988), for instance, traces similarities between Weber’s view of vocation and that of his near contemporary, the novelist Thomas Mann. In many of his literary works, Mann portrays the struggle of the artist as a struggle for vocational freedom against the sterility and entrapment of the conventions of bourgeois working life. Other literary critics see the theme of work and vocation not just in the works of Weber and Mann but as a common feature of other writers of the period (Barrett, 1989; Danon, 1985; Mintz, 1978). “As reason had been to the Enlightenment, work was to the Victorians: an overarching theme that sanctioned a multitude of diverse, often antagonistic positions” (Mintz, 1978, p. 1). In the novels of George Eliot, for instance, Mintz identifies a central focus on probing the contradictions of work and exploring the complex relationships between vocation and capital. The counterideal of a secularized notion of calling or vocation as portrayed by Eliot involves finding or expressing one’s true calling through asserting one’s unique individuality, quite apart from work or wealth accumulation, through passionate commitment to a particular work
(of art or social betterment), in opposition to the corrupting lure of worldly profit or self-advancement. Vocation is “experienced as a sense of inner conviction rather than as a spiritual prompting; instead of religious fervor it is ‘intellectual passion’ which accompanies the work; the work itself is active, not contemplative” (p. 18).

The writings of Mann, Eliot, and others reflected a sense of secular vocation that was more inward and contrarian than in previous understandings of the term. What came to the fore in their work was the idea of vocation as a form of self-expression, personal uniqueness, and fulfillment. Alongside more conservative views of vocation as being centrally concerned “with fitting people’s qualifications and what can be ascertained as to their aptitudes, into specific kinds of already existing jobs” (Emmet, 1958, p. 244), this—opposing—view has been amplified and echoed in 20th-century usage, where the meaning of vocation has come to reflect a quest for personal meaning and singular life purpose. Parker Palmer (2000) characteristically identifies the search for vocation as a search for personal identity, involving unique striving and, often, separation from the expected norm: “Our deepest calling is to grow into our own authentic selfhood, whether or not it conforms to some image of who we ought to be” (p. 16). Authentic selfhood, from this perspective, is not achieved only through work, but work is typically a central part of the configuration, with meaningful work standing as a necessary feature of a full and fruitful life.

For social critic Zygmunt Bauman (1998), the notion of finding authentic selfhood through work reflects a skewed and inegalitarian worldview where the work ethic has been supplanted by a work aesthetic:

Work as the meaning of life, work as the core axis of everything that counts, as the source of pride, self-esteem, honor and deference or notoriety, in short, work as vocation has become the privilege of the few; a distinctive mark of the elite. (p. 34)

The majority, by contrast, are too often locked into meaningless or degrading jobs that offer little opportunity for notoriety or fulfillment. The sole vocation available to everybody, for Bauman, is (intended ironically) the “vocation of the consumer” (p. 30)—fulfillment not through working, but through the fruits of work in an endless cycle of working and spending. “Vocation may be many things,” he goes on to say about this imbalanced state of affairs, “but what most emphatically it is not—not in this rendition of it at any rate—is a proposition for the life-project or a whole-life strategy” (p. 36).

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ADULT EDUCATION

It is interesting how one small word can go through such a range of tones and pitches of moral register from one era to another, from the lexicon of one speaker to the next. With the passage of time, there has been such an alteration and aggregation
of meanings of vocation that this snapshot review of them has something of the feel of a woozy stagger through a hall of mirrors. The meanings pitch and sway and steadily retreat from easy grasp; there is much more to be unpacked than can be accomplished in this burly striding across the landscape of centuries. As Williams (1976) notes, the study of meanings is always an unfinished business, because language requires many speakers for it to be active, and to be active is to be changing, “shaping and reshaping, in real circumstances and from profoundly different and important points of view” (p. 22). Despite the elusiveness of the venture, however, what emerges from this historical review is a picture of vocation undergoing, over the course of centuries, a number of significant transformations and reversals. What began as a removal from the productive and economic sphere became by various turns transformed into a spiritual ally of that sphere and then by various further turns transformed again into a moral critique of it. These different views have not successively replaced each other, of course, but have all come to jostle along together side by side. The relationship between vocation and work has similarly moved like a kind of dance, sketching out a range of moral attitudes toward work as a dimension of human experience, as work itself has gone from being a burdensome necessity with no positive moral worth to being a value in its own right, “the pivot around which everything else turns” (Beder, 2000, p. 14).

But so what? What is the benefit of tracing such a long course of change and alternation? As Williams (1976) states with no apology, the study of vocabulary and its historical shifts in meaning contributes “virtually nothing” (p. 21) to the resolution of social problems. “What can be contributed” by the study of vocabulary, he contends, is not resolution but “perhaps, at times, just that extra edge of consciousness” (p. 21). Or, as the labor historian Herbert Gutman (1984) puts it, “The central value of historical understanding is that it transforms historical givens into historical contingencies. It enables us to see the structures in which we live . . . as only one among many other possible experiences” (p. 202), susceptible to critique and reflective of deep-seated social conflicts. When it comes to work and vocation, a number of things become evident from the long view of Western history. One is just how deeply current conceptions of work are infused within the capitalist ethos and how thoroughly the idea of occupational work has “invaded and taken over the whole realm of human action and human existence” (Bernstein, 1997, p. 11). The particularities of the modern view of work as central to human worth and dignity become clearly apparent when held up against past eras, when work held no such value and figured more as a hindrance than a pathway to honor and freedom. The ideology of work as a source of dignity—and the paradoxical dual role of this ideology in affirming ordinary working life as well as recruiting unwitting conscripts to the service of the dominant economic order—is so deeply entrenched in the modern worldview that finding ways to get outside it and critique it is a perennially necessary philosophical task. History offers no idyllic vision of a romantic past when work was easier and better (often, indeed, it is more likely to offer the contrary), but helps to defamiliarize the particularities of modern conceptions of work and nar-
ratives of vocation that are otherwise all too omnipresent and all too easy to take as given.

In the context of adult education, with the increasing emphasis on work and workplace learning in the field, the long view of Western intellectual history offers a way of broadening the conception of work so that the narrow field of vision of work in its capitalist garb can be disrupted and critically examined. The medieval Benedictine ideal of setting prices below market value, for instance, may be a reflection of bad business sense or naïve idealism from the contemporary viewpoint, but it offers an alternative conception of virtue against which contemporary notions of education in the interests of profit making can be held up for critical scrutiny. If adult education is to contribute to the process of understanding the nature and significance of work in contemporary society, rather than simply serving the function of preparing workers within the present system, then further analysis of the narratives of moral growth embedded in the contemporary work paradigm is a necessary critical undertaking. The history of vocation also reveals that the modern emphasis on meaningful work as a necessary avenue toward self-fulfillment is not only alien to the view of work through much of Western history but reflects a strong bias of class privilege—an internalized feature of popular desires and aspirations, but available in practical terms to only a privileged few. History suggests that the idea of work-as-vocation must be examined against the real social and political conditions that contribute to the less-than-ideal reality of working life for the majority.

Another insight revealed by this historical study of the meaning of vocation is that alongside the rise to dominance and esteem of work as labor market participation, the critique of work under capitalism has been a phenomenon of similarly long standing. The differences in adult education between conservative and radical connotations of vocation language have deep roots, going back at least to the 19th century and possibly earlier, as expressed in the writings of George Eliot, Thomas Mann, and other social and literary critics of capitalism and industrialization. This is not to diminish or neutralize the differences between adult education as vocation on one hand and vocational adult education on the other, but to situate them against a wider backdrop in which both critical and affirmative stances toward the dominant work paradigm are equally constitutive parts of that paradigm. Although this may be reflective of the relentless internecine squabbles of a deep-seated “legitimation crisis” (Taylor, 1985) lurking at the divided core of contemporary capitalist society, it may also lend a note of legitimacy and necessity to the whole critical endeavor. Ideology critique of economic rationality is not a novel, postmodern invention but a legitimate and vital part of the Western intellectual tradition. The history of vocation as a word with strong association to ideals outside the domain of economic rationality invites further interrogation of work as an ideological, as well as functional, social construct.

As the domain of work continues to be a matter of pressing and growing concern in adult education, critical questions about the moral as well as practical aspects of
work are an essential part of the ongoing scholarship of the field. For instance, is the view of adult education as a vocation a liberatory view or simply another variation on the “jobs, jobs, jobs” hegemony of the global marketplace? Where are practices such as volunteer work, subsistence work, and activist work situated, and how are they legitimized (or not) within the dominant constructions of work and workplace learning? How might training-for-employment programs be reconsidered when viewed against a broader historical backdrop where idleness and unemployment, now commonly viewed with the taint of social inadequacy, can be seen to have once been virtues? Alongside such pressing work-life developments as globalization, flexible labor markets, corporate downsizing, the aging of the labor force, and more, questions about vocation provide a vital lens for examining the mix of ethical presuppositions underlying these discussions. Why does work matter? Who gets to say? Given the scope of historical possibilities for viewing vocation not only as a mode of workforce participation but also as something that stands outside the world of industry, money, and markets, it becomes possible to ask what kind of work is truly necessary to create the world we want. Vocation is indeed many things, to paraphrase Bauman, but what it most emphatically could be is a term that invites further reflection and discussion about the competing moral narratives about work and social practice that infuse contemporary discourse in popular, political, and academic discourse. As Collins (1998) asserts, “A critical task for educators at this time is to sustain a larger purview on the meaning of work, and, in particular, of its significance as the means through which human creative capacities and human potential are realized” (p. 83).

There is more at stake in this than a neutral, historical case study of changing moral vocabulary about work and purposeful practice; understanding the cultural origins of the various narratives of vocation embedded in contemporary Western culture stands to challenge a political regime in which labor market meanings of work too often go uncritiqued and unquestioned. The history of vocation reveals the extent to which other reckonings of social value and purposeful activity—such as contemplation, so admired by the ancients; such as leisure seen not as a break from work but as something that exists, and exists legitimately, entirely outside of work’s frame of reference—have been diminished. As the Marxist economist André Gorz (1989) has argued, “There is an urgent need to create a society which rejects the work ethic in favor of an emancipatory ethic of free time” (p. 34). Adult education as vocation invites consideration of questions of play, as well as those of work, as fundamental to the task of understanding the full scope of human learning, striving and desiring—the “ontological vocation,” as Freire (1968/1970) would have it, “of becoming more fully human” (p. 22).
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